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Abstract
The paper studies effects of country level determinants on the rate of finan-
cial development and, in particular, assesses the empirical question whether
democracy and political freedom can enhance financial development, as mea-
sured by Bank Private Credit to GDP and Liquid Liabilities to GDP. Using
Fixed Effects estimation techniques and a panel data for a list of 39 countries
over the period 1990 to 2011, we provide evidence that suggests positive link
between political openness and financial development. The empirical evidence
also confirms financial openness and real per capita income to be positively
correlated to financial deepening and in contrast, we find that size of financial
sector does not spur the rate of financial development.
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Proposed topic Determinants of Financial Development
Topic characteristics The positive effect of financial development on eco-
nomic growth makes a strong incentive for researchers to study the factors
that affect the financial development. Voghouei, Azali, & Jamali (2011) sum
up numbers of studies devoted to the determinants of financial development
following way: legal traditions, institutions, government intervention, open-
ness policy, political economy factors and some other factors, like culture and
macroeconomic situation can be main instruments to promote financial devel-
opment. Although, there is a solid literature providing theoretical overview of
the determinants of the financial development, further research is needed to
estimate impact of each determinant on financial development and each other.
In this master thesis will be used the Global Financial Development Database.
The GFDD contains extensive dataset of financial development for 203 coun-
tries. The dataset has been last updated in 2013 and includes annual data from
1960 through 2011. The database is built on a ‘4x2 framework’. Precisely, it
contains degrees of 1) depth, 2) access, 3) efficiency, and 4) stability. These
four measures capture 1) financial institutions (banks, insurance companies
etc.) and 2) financial markets (stock markets and bond markets).
Hypotheses
 Hypothesis #1: Political freedom, particularly protection of political
rights and civil liberties, is positively linked to the rate of financial deep-
ening;
 Hypothesis #2: There is a significant positive correlation between finan-
cial openness and rate of financial development;
Master Thesis Proposal xii
 Hypothesis #3: Real income per capita has a significant positive impact
on the deepening of a financial sector;
 Hypothesis #4: Deeper scaled financial sector does not necessarily cause
higher rate of financial development.
Methodology In this study we will apply the error component models to
analyze the panel data.
Fixed Effects model is usually well suited for analyzing the impact of vari-
able that vary over time. The model explores the relationship between ex-
planatory and response variables within entity. Each explanatory variable has
its own characteristics that might or might not affect explained variable. The
equation for the fixed-effect transforms to:
yit = αi + xitb+ uit
Where αi is different intercept for each individual and
âi = ȳi − x̄ib
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Financial development has first order positive effect on long run economic
growth. On the macroeconomic level, Levine & Zervos (1998) argued that
banking and financial markets development is relevant and favorable predictor
of real growth. In addition, on the microeconomic level, Demirguc-Kunt &
Maksimovic (1996a) showed that good financial institutions and access to fi-
nancial resources play solid role for firms’ good performance as well as for whole
industries. Large number of theoretical and empirical researches suggests the
same results, that there is a steady finance-growth relation.
The effect of financial development on economic growth makes a strong in-
centive for researchers to study the factors that affect the financial development
itself. Although, there is a solid literature providing theoretical overview of the
determinants of the financial development, empirical researches are somewhat
incomplete and further research is needed to estimate impact of each deter-
minant on financial development and each other. Voghouei, Azali, & Jamali
(2011) sum up numbers of studies devoted to the determinants of financial
development following way: legal traditions, institutions, government interven-
tion, openness policy, political economy factors and some other factors, like
culture and macroeconomic situation can be main instruments to promote fi-
nancial development.
Our paper departs from the extant literature by focusing on political free-
dom effects on financial development. The main contribution of our thesis is
using a list of updated datasets and somewhat original proxy measure of po-
litical economy factors. Unlike to previous empirical studies, the freedom in
the world survey is applied as an estimate of political freedom and democracy.
Other variables are selected from various sources: (1) Bank Private Credit to
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GDP and Liquid Liabilities to GDP, the response variables to evaluate rate
of financial development are from the World Bank’s Global Financial Devel-
opment Dataset; (2)The World Bank’s World Development Indicators dataset
is a source of independent variables; (3) Further, we incorporate Kaopen in-
dex associated with Chinn and Ito dataset and (4) two alternative measures of
political freedom and democracy are utilized form the Freedom in the World
Survey and PolityIV project. We apply Fixed Effects estimation technique to
analyze a panel data of 39 countries, including OECD high-income countries
and middle-income countries from Europe and Central Asia, over the period
1990 to 2011.
The existing literature argues political, legal and cultural institutions to
be driving force of financial development. The rule of law based governance,
property right protection and strong mechanism of contract enforcement is
considered to be the ground for spurring financial development.
A number of studies associate aforementioned fundamental political and le-
gal institutions to be highly dependent on democracy, a system that is charac-
terized by population’s involvement in a country’s political life. In a democratic
country political life is highly competitive, public office positions are elective
based on popular voting and governors are limited in their actions by law
based constraints. For instance, Haber, North, & Weingast (2008) outline that
democracy and competitive political environment effectively leads to higher
competition in financial sector, since rulers are limited to control or suppress
financial sector. La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, & Shleifer (2002) link democracy
to financial development based on the fact that democratic systems discourage
government ownership of banks and other financial institutions. Siegle, Wein-
stein, & Halperin (2004) further add that democracy has a positive effects on
financial development since it supports balance and self-correction mechanisms,
openness and other important institutions.
Generally, all the aforementioned reasoning supports a suggestion that po-
litical freedom and democracy can boost financial development. However, as
Yang (2011) observes, there are few empirical studies directly testing the hy-
pothesis and most of them apply cross sectional data analysis without treating
country specific factors.
The paper closely follows model specification suggested by Chinn & Ito
(2006), however we apply a modified vector of explanatory variables. To di-
minish existing endogenous problem, 5 years rate of financial development is
regressed on the level of financial development, political freedom, capital ac-
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count openness and other regressors. All explanatory variables are lagged by
5 years. We similarly to Baltagi, Demetriades, & Law (2009) and Chinn &
Ito (2006) keep number of independent variables fairly small to keep better in-
terpretability of coefficients.The empirical part of the study, besides the main
regression, provides a specification with an alternative measure of political free-
dom and democracy to check robustness of our suggestions. Additionally, we
provide regressions with dropped explanatory variable to evaluate whether re-
sults are stable to such modifications.
In contrast to the empirical study by Yang (2011), which argued that sta-
tistically significant link between democracy and financial development disap-
pears once panel data model applied, we find democracy to have statistically
significant positive impact on the rate of financial development by utilizing
Fixed Effects panel data estimation techniques. The results support the sug-
gestion that competitive political system can enhance financial development.
Furthermore, the empirical results confirm a few other important hypotheses:
First, our findings are in line with the main conclusion of Chinn & Ito (2006;
2002), arguing that a county level decision of financial openness enhances rate
of financial development. We utilize a comprehensive index measuring a coun-
try’s ‘de jure’ capital account openness. All output results indicate statistical
significant link between financial openness and financial development. Second,
we provide an empirical evidence that real per capita income has a positive im-
pact on financial development. The results are in line with previous studies and
common wisdom. Two main explanations of a such intercorrelation are follow-
ing: (1) wealth effect of higher impact increases demand for a better financial
sector and (2) the variable can be seen as a proxy measure of institutional and
technological development. Third, we find financial development level lagged
by 5 years not to be positively linked to financial growth rate. Fourth, based on
the empirical results one could argue that for the selected countries total tax
to GDP and GDP deflator level are positively correlated to the rate of financial
development.
Our empirical study closely follows treatment suggested by Chinn & Ito
(2006; 2002), however we extend set of explanatory variables and most impor-
tantly incorporate a measure evaluating democracy and political freedom. The
Chinn and Ito model regresses the rate of financial development on the level
of financial development and other explanatory variables, where all regressors
are lagged by five years. The main advantage of the estimation technique is
that using five years horizon effectively diminishes endogeneity problem. Un-
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like Chinn & Ito (2006; 2002), which utilizes OLS and 2SLS approaches, we
apply Fixed Effects model to control for country specific factors.
This thesis is structured as follows, the second chapter provides a com-
prehensive overview of the theoretical framework of the topic. The chapter
starts with description of finance-growth nexus, which underlines importance
of financial development, followed by reviews of the existing theoretical and
empirical studies and provides list of determinants that are considered to have
important effect on financial development. Chapter 3 presents description of
data and methodology that is applied for the empirical part of the paper. It
includes detailed description of dependent and explanatory variables. In Chap-
ter 4, methodology described in Chapter 3 is utilized and results are presented.
Second part of the chapter provides robustness checks: analysis with an alter-
native measure of political freedom and analysis when a regressors is drop, to
estimate whether the results stay stable. Chapter 5 concludes the finding of
the thesis and provides final remarks. The references and the annexes include
all the information about sources cited in the paper and all the relevant data




In this chapter, an overview of existing literature is provided on the topic of
determinants of financial development. First section contains description of ex-
isting literature on finance-growth nexus. It stresses how financial development
is linked to the economic growth and points to the importance to study the
determinants of financial development.
The second section presents some influential researches addressing the topic
on financial development factors. The literature overview follows the frame-
work suggested by Voghouei et al. (2011) drawing following groups of de-
terminants affecting on financial system: (a)legal traditions, (b)institutions,
(c)financial liberalization, (d)openness policy: trade and capital account open-
ness, (e)political economy factors and (f)other factors.
2.2 Finance-Growth nexus
A discussion about the relationship between finance and growth is not a new
topic. Schumpeter (1934) pointed out the importance of financial systems in
advancing innovations and concluded that economies with better-developed
financial system have higher rate of economic growth. Robinson (1979) argued
contrary causality effect; countries with higher economic growth expectations
try to have well-developed financial systems that can provide finances needed
to back the expected economic growth. That is to say, the level of economic
development leads financial development.
The scatter plot Figure 2.1 shows correlation between real GDP per capita
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and financial development measured by Bank private credit to GDP. The graph
illustrates positive link between the two variables.
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Modern theories stressed significance of financial development for economic
growth in different ways. Auerbach & Uddin Siddiki (2004) argued that devel-
oped financial systems (1) increase the productivity in the usage of investment
resources and (2) supports higher rate of savings. However, this theory was
contradicting one of the most accepted assumptions that economic resources
are allocated efficiently.
Endogenous growth theory introduced by Romer (1986) overcame this con-
tradiction by assuming that if an economic agent increases its saving, it has
spillover effect on other economic agents and consequently, the productivity of
economy and GDP growth rate increases.
Levine (2005) summarizes the existing literature on the finance-growth
nexus by drawing five financial system functions that decreases transaction
and information costs. These activities are:
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 Providing information ex ante about available investments and support-
ing capital allocation process
 Monitoring investment projects and advancing corporate governance by
providing finance
 Promoting the trading, diversification, and risk management
 Increasing level of savings
 Supporting the exchange process
As a result, financial development decreases level of market frictions and
supports long-term real growth. The idea that financial development is pos-
itively linked to long-run economic development is supported by large body
of empirical researches. To discuss them is out of goal of this topic, but the
fact itself further motivates researchers to study factors that affect financial
development itself.
2.3 Determinants of Financial Development
There is a large number of factors affecting financial development and vari-
ous literature group them in different ways. Voghouei et al. (2011) suggest the
following categories of determinants: 1) legal traditions, 2)institutions, 3)finan-
cial liberalization, 4)openness policy, 5)political economy factors and 6)other
factors.
Legal Traditions:
One of the most influential theory in describing the role of the legal traditions,
”Law and Finance” by López de Silanes et al. (1998), highlights the role of legal
institutions to explain why level of financial development varies greatly among
countries. The first part of law and finance theory points to the importance of
legal traditions ability to ensure protection of property rights, and help contract
enforcement mechanism, which defines the way creditors and shareholders are
treated.
In the second part of the theory, the differences among courtiers is de-
scribed through existence of different legal traditions, which were spread across
the world during conquests and European colonization. Two types of legal
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traditions are distinguished: civil law (French, German and Scandinavian) and
common law (British). The research points that countries with British common
law have better financial system. On the other had the most unfavorable legal
tradition is French common law.
Another approach to explain differences was to look how adaptable legal
traditions are (Merryman, Clark, & Haley 1994). Based on this idea, Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine (2001) develop dynamic law and finance theory,
where the main focus is how adaptable is a legal tradition and if it is able to
reshape itself according to the level of financial and economic development.
Institutions:
Endowment theory first advanced by Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson (2005),
suggests that the differences in economic institutions are the main determinants
of the level of economic and financial development. In some countries, institu-
tions are supporting rule of law and therefore creating an environment, where
long run investments are rational. At the same time in other counties, insti-
tutions are harmful for progress. The differences are explained mainly though
colonization strategies, whether Europeans had long run goals, and therefore
established functional institutions, or the only interest was to transfer resources
from the colonized place.
Law & Habibullah (2009) provides brief summary of existing empirical lit-
erature and underlines several important issues. The effect of political economy
factors and institutions on the level of FD is not well documented. Rajan &
Zingales (2003) study the determinants of financial development. Particularly,
they assesses the effects of trade and capital markets openness. The main goal
of the paper is to analyze the factors that made financial development volatile
over twentieth century across the countries. For example, taking into account
a number of measures most countries had better financial system in 1913 com-
pared to the financial development level in 1980. Exploring dataset of selected
twenty-four countries, the authors develop the interest group theory that em-
phasizes the role of trade and financial openness in reduction negative effects
that influential economic agents might have. The incumbents, the influential
economic agents, are contradicting financial development since they get abnor-
mal returns from financial repression and from poor competition on the market.
The paper provides empirical evidence to support the openness hypothesis.In
the empirical study by Rajan & Zingales (2003), data used is limited and it
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contains only the pre-World War II time spread. As a result the conclusions
might be out of date.
Other authors addressed related questions as well, but most of them exam-
ined particularly the importance of legal systems and its origins like López de
Silanes et al. (1998) and whether these factors affect on financial systems de-
velopment. However, in Beck et al. (2003) empirically documented that as-
sociation of countries’ endowment to the financial intermediary level is more
robust that in case of legal traditions. In the research, ’settler mortality’ theory
is directly applied to explaining factors affecting financial development more
explicitly. The empirical results long run institutional endowment meters for
financial development (Beck et al. 2003).
Pagano & Volpin (2002) argue that balance of power distribution among
social and economic groups have strong effect how regulation and enforcement
mechanisms are formed across countries. The main idea is that private inter-
ests of these groups and its members can affect on financial development in
a way that favors their goals.Rajan & Zingales (2003) further clarifies role of
influential groups in the process of forming financial systems. They support the
idea, that the decision makers might have incentive not to support development
of effective and competitive financial system in case it is opposing their per-
sonal interests. Particularly, interest of incumbents are discussed which would
be against of open, transparent and competitive financial system in favor of
financial system that supports their prosperity.
Financial Liberalization:
Arestis (2006) suggests that financial liberalization can be seen as a sum of the
following components: privatization of government owned financial institutions
and banks, guarantee of free entry into the financial sector and central bank
independence, abolishment of credit control tools and implementation of loose
interest rates control mechanism. Liberalizing financial markets should lead to
better allocation of resources, higher level of investments and higher efficiency.
There are number of controversial theories, which see financial liberalization
in different ways. Pro-liberalization theories highlight the fact that minimum
reserve requirements and interest rate control tools can be seen as taxes, which
as a result makes hole financial sector to shrink and be less effective (Fry 1995).
Contrary to that view, other researchers give higher weight to information
asymmetry on financial markets (Schiantarelli, Atiyas, Gerard Caprio, Harris,
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& Weiss 1993). Therefore, financial liberalization does not necessarily lead to
financial development.
Other point against financial liberalization is that it might cause fragility
of financial markets and banking sector. The empirical evidence shows that
banking crisis is more likely to happen in countries with more liberalized finan-
cial systems. However, the risk is reducing if the economic institutions are well
developed (Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic 1996b).
Openness policies. Trade Openness:
It has been observed that the significant growth in trade and capital account
liberalization is convenient for country’s welfare, leading to openness in inter-
national trade and capital flow, which could develop its financial markets.
If we analyze the trade openness, it is said that the export and import
industries can be stimulated by a well-opened financial sector. This financial
sector will address the savings into the private sector, empowering the economy
to specialize and benefit from the economies of scale, which lead to lowering
costs. This will allow entrepreneurs to initiate profitable projects. Hence was
it is said above, the financial development contributes to trade openness. Nev-
ertheless this can be seen in the opposite direction too; Do & Levchenko (2004)
pointed that the country’s financial development is an endogenous variable, so
that trade will influence it.
Huang & Temple (2005) find that raise in level of market openness results
increase in financial depth. In addition, (Beck et al. 2003) points out that
countries with better financial systems are more likely to have more manufac-
tured goods exports to GDP more merchandise exports. Levine (2001) shows
that easing restrictions on international portfolio flows will affect on liquidity
of stock markets positively, and allowing more foreign based bank to be present
affect on the performance of inner banking system positively.
Openness policies. Capital Account Openness:
Chinn & Ito (2002) find that capital control strongly is connected with country’s
financial development. The paper addresses the link between capital account
openness and the level of financial development. The authors by providing the
precise literature review, highlight the necessity of further researches in the
area. Using panel error correction model they manage to deal with business
criticality of data and existing endogeneity problem and by incorporating new
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broader and more sophisticated measures of financial development and capital
control the authors manage to document relevance of capital account openness
for financial development. The findings are documented for developed market
countries where proxy of financial development is stock market value traded
and for transition market countries as well.
Klein & Olivei (1999) stress that capital account liberalization tent to en-
hance growth via affecting financial system and deepening it. The results hold
for industrialized countries but there is little empirical proof for counties which
are not members of OECD. As the authors suggest the capital account lib-
eralization leads to reducing transaction and information asymmetry costs, it
also supports effective allocation of resources in large financial funds and di-
minishes presence of moral hazards in management behavior. As a result the
paper concludes that financial openness should spur effectiveness of financial
sector. Further the authors argue that capital account openness is a key factor
in establishing international standards and high professional requirements for
financial sectors across countries. The ‘flight to quality’ also leads to innova-
tions and deepens financial sectors in developing economies.
Svaleryd & Vlachos (2002) presented that by offering entirely diversified risk
given by institutions with better insurance possibilities, special interest groups
pressure for protection will be eliminated and free trade will be promoted.
Otherwise, following liberalization, the demand for insurance will increase and
this will lead to financial development.
Voghouei et al. (2011) pointed out that liberalization of capital markets can
apply to both inflows and outflows of capital. Therefore, financial openness of a
country should be analyzed using the broad picture of the openness measures.
Taking into consideration the neo-classical model of economic growth, we
know that liberalizing the capital account, the international allocation of re-
sources will become more efficient and will have favorable effects. Countries
will be willing to allocate their capital in countries with higher interest rates.
These capital inflows and outflows of capital resources will lower the cost of
capital in developing countries and increment investment and economic growth
temporarily. Moreover, the domestic banking system and the financial inno-
vation that develops the range of financial services can increase, by the sub-
sidiaries of foreign banks.
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Political Economy Factors:
Financial development is also well determining by the political economy fac-
tors. Voghouei et al. (2011) noted that political choice, whether in the form
of authoritarian opportunism, oligopolistic capture, or electoral democracy de-
termines the influential forces affecting the development and operation of the
financial system.
The politics and finance view suggested by (Beck et al. 2001), underlines
that a country’s financial system under centralized, authoritarian, closed po-
litical regimes are more likely to be poorly developed than in countries with
free electoral democracy, with open and highly competitive government which
is monitored under the check and law based constraints.
The political economic factors influence directly the financial development
but also influence indirectly other determinants of financial development. This
is explained in the next example: Even though one of the determinants of finan-
cial development is the economic institution, this determinant is endogenous
and determined by political institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2005) argued that
different economic institutions lead to different distribution of resources.
Rajan & Zingales (2003) argue that the elite/powerful groups may or may
not favor financial development. One reason of the elite for financial repression
is political choice because it benefits a special group of people with access to
investment capital, corporate control and foreign exchange licenses.
In contrast to development-first approach, which argues that political free-
dom and democracy could be a product of economic and financial development,
Siegle, Weinstein, & Halperin (2004) suggest that democracy could be seen it-
self as a source of development. The authors argue that democratic systems are
‘always stronger, calmer, and more caring’ than authoritarian regimes. Based
on the reasoning, the paper suggests that electoral democracy and political
freedom can spur financial development, since it supports building an impor-
tant institutions such as checks and balance mechanism, self-control system
and rule based constraints.
La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, & Shleifer (2002) suggest that countries with
electoral democracy system have more developed financial system. The main
pillar of such inter-correlation, as the authors highlight, is that democratic
regimes have small incentive to keep commercial banks and other financial
institutions in public ownership, which itself supports financial development.
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Other factors:
The macroeconomic factors also influence financial development. Inflation, in-
come, investment, and economic growth are argued to have an effect on financial
development.
Greenwood & Jovanovic (1990) pointed out that economy higher growth
rate, decrease in financial intermediation costs because of raise in competition
results larger amount of available funds which are used for investment. Levine
(2005) has addressed the importance of income as a determinant of financial
development. It was documented that the income per capita and savings rate
are positively linked to financial development estimated by amount of bank
assets, number of bank branches and amount of employees for 23 developing
market economies.
Figure 2.2: Path diagram of financial development determinates
Source: Voghouei, Azali, & Jamali (2011).
Huybens & Smith (1999) suggested that inflation influences financial de-
velopment in a negative way. The higher the inflation the less real return of
money, this leads to less credit. If the financial sector is granting fewer loans, it
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means the allocation of the money is being inefficient, and this have a negative
effect in financial development. Culture and geography are other two factors
that are considered to determine financial development. Nevertheless less re-
search have been done to analyze the relationship and impact they have on
financial development.
Stulz & Williamson (2003) underlined the effect of cultural differences, es-
timated by differences in language and religion, on the level of financial de-
velopment. The research documented that culture can be factor explaining
cross-county variations how investor rights are protected and contracts are en-
forced, and particularly how creditors rights varies.
As it is shown in the Figure 2.2, explanatory variable are affecting on the
independent variables directly and through affecting other dependent variables.
We would pay particular attention to the analysis of political factors since as the
theory suggests they should be on of the most crucial components in supporting
a county’s financial development. Voghouei et al. (2011) suggests that the
political factors not only affect directly on financial development but they also
play a important role in forming institutional and openness environment in a
country.
2.4 Hypotheses of the Study
We will follow the theoretical framework and test the hypotheses using up to
date dataset that includes cross country time series up to 2011 and incorporates
somewhat original estimation of political factors. Particularly, we assess effect
of democracy and freedom using the political freedom index calculated from
the Freedom in the World Survey. Additionally, an alternative more widely
utilized measure of democracy Polit2 is applied to see weather the conclusions
are persistent. The hypotheses of the paper are following:
 Hypothesis #1: Political freedom, particularly protection of political
rights and civil liberties, is positively linked to the rate of financial deep-
ening;
 Hypothesis #2: There is a significant positive correlation between finan-
cial openness and rate of financial development;
 Hypothesis #3: Real income per capita has a significant positive impact
on the deepening of a financial sector;
2. Theoretical Framework 15
 Hypothesis #4: Deeper scaled financial sector does not necessarily cause
higher rate of financial development.
Two measures of financial depth, Bank private credit to GDP and Liq-





Objective of this chapter is to provide detailed description of the data and
methodology applied in the thesis. In the first part of the chapter we will
describe the variables utilized in the empirical study and motivation of our
selection. The dataset is constructed from a number of sources:
 The data of response variable are extracted from the world bank’s GFDD;
 For the most part explanatory variables are piked for another world bank’s
database, WDI;
 Political freedom Index is drawn form The freedom house survey;
 Kaopen index comes form dataset associated with Chinn and Ito.
Additionally we incorporate variable Polity2 from the project PolityIV to
see if the results are stable once a different measure of electoral democracy is
applied.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Measures of Financial Development
Generally a deep and efficient financial system provides great advantages for a
county. It supports smoothening of consumption over time by saving in good
times and spending in bad periods, also makes easier to organize necessary
funds for retirement.
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The measure of financial development are extracted from the World Bank’s
Global Financial Development Database (GFDD). The dataset follows a 4X2.
More precisely it includes variables capturing four aspects of financial develop-
ment: depth, access, efficiency and stability. All the components of financial
development themselves describe two sides of financial system: financial insti-
tutions including banking sector, private insurance companies and so on; and
financial markets including stock markets and bond markets.
It is arguable that the most widely used among them is the measures cap-
turing financial depth (size) of a county. Financial depth can be described as
the sector of finance compared to the total economy. Particularly it is a bulk
of banking sector, financial markets, insurance companies and other financial
institutions summed up and studied in comparison to real economic output of
a county (Čihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen, & Levine 2012).
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Source: GFDD
Wide range of proxies that capture depth of financial system are provided
in the updated GFDD: Bank private credit to GDP, Deposit money bank assets
to GDP, Non-bank financial institutions’ assets to GDP, Deposit money bank
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assets to deposit money bank assets and central bank assets, Liquid liabilities
to GDP, Central bank assets to GDP, Financial system deposits to GDP, In-
surance company assets to GDP, Private credit by deposit money banks and
other financial institutions to GDP and Stock market capitalization to GDP
Stock market total value traded to GDP.
We incorporate in our thesis two particular measures of financial depth: (1)
Bank private credit to GDP and (2) Liquid liabilities to GDP. Comparison of
the variable means is provided in the Figure 3.1.
Figure A.1 describes trends of the selected financial development indicators
from 1990 to 2011. As the figures depict the two measures had the same trends
for the last two decades for the majority of the countries.
Bank private credit to GDP
A measure of financial depth (size) that arguably is the most widely used in
empirical papers is private credit to GDP. Particularly, the variable represents
the amount of inner private credit provided to the real economy inside a country
by banking sector and the measure is represented in percentages. According
to the definition of the proxy, it does not include amount of credit issued
to governments, to public institutions and state owed companies. Financial
resources provided by central banks lay out of the measure as well.
Financial depth, measured by private credit to GDP varies across countries
with a large scale, and it is strongly linked with GDP per capita level. For
instance, private credit to GDP in developed market countries is on average
four times bigger than in developing market countries and the value in high-
income countries is around 100 percent. Analyzing the measure, countries with
deep financial system geographically can be found in Europe. Other topping
economies are Canada, South Africa and Australia. Concerning the emerging
market countries, China’s financial system according to the proxy is topping
others like Brazil, India, Russia and Turkey. United States’ financial system
according to the measure is lagged behind the level of china and is listed above
countries with average level. The reason of it most likely is that United States’
financial sector relies on financial markets more than other counties do (Čihák
et al. 2012).
Furthermore, financial depth expressed by private credit to GDP, is strong
correlated to long-run real growth and it is as well statistically linked to level
of poverty decrease. However, one could argue that a very high ration of
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financial depth expressed by private credit/GDP does not necessarily mean a
positive sign for an economy. For example the highest rations of the measure
had following eight countries: Cyprus, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Netherlands,
United Kingdom, Luxembourg and Switzerland and indeed the listed countries
had the highest economic fluctuations since the 2008 recession.
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Figure 3.2 represents a scatter plot of between Bank private credit to
GDP and counties. It illustrates the obvious differences across countries and
highlights the heterogeneity of the data.
Liquid liabilities to GDP
An alternative measure to estimate depth (size) of a county’s financial sector
is Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. Liquid liabilities are so call broad money
denoted by M3. The measure represents (1) a sum of central bank currency
and accumulated deposits-M0; (2) added electronic currency and transferable
saving such as transferable money deposit-M1; (3) added time deposits, saving
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deposits, foreign currency convertible deposits, securities of repurchase trans-
actions and securities of money savings; (4) added deposits in foreign currency,
commercial papers, traveler’s checks and shares of market funds or mutual
funds (Čihák et al. 2012).
Liquid liabilities to GDP represents a broad measure of the depth of fi-
nancial system expressed in percentages compared to gross domestic products.
While quasi-liquid liabilities include only M2 aggregate. Valickova, Havranek,
& Horvath (2014) sum up the existing literature why one might argue using
broad money. According to the paper, using of M3/GDP mainly is motivated
because the measure of money and quasi money to gross domestic product-
M2/GDP, is limited in the countries where the money are widely used as a
store of value (Yu, Hassan, & Sanchez 2012).
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Figure 3.3 confirms similar characteristics of Liquid liabilities to GDP and
Bank private credit to GDP datasets. The scatter plot and the means of
Liquid liabilities to GDP vary by a large extent across countries that prove
heterogeneity of the time data.
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3.2.2 Measures of Explanatory Variables
The Freedom in the World survey - Political Freedom
A number of studies associate fundamental set of institutional development to
be based on the democracy, a political mechanism which supports population
involvement in the decision making process, public figures are elected based
on fair elections and governments are under the rule based control. Haber
et al. (2008) provided arguments that political freedom and openness should
lead to the openness and better performance of a country’s financial sector
as well. Democratic mechanism is guarantee of population participation in a
competitive policymaking process that leaves governments without instruments
to affect negatively on financial sector based on behavioral hazard and private
benefits. The result is a developed financial system which is more efficient in
allocating and distributing financial streams. The same reasoning was drawn
by a number of other empirical and theoretical works.
However, Recent empirical paper by Yang (2011) argued that the empir-
ical results are fragile to panel data estimation. Albeit, the cross sectional
estimations showed the impact of democracy on financial development to be
significant, the link disappeared when the author applied the panel data esti-
mation and fixed effects model, which deals with endogenous across variables
and takes into account country specific factors. The same results were drawn
for democracy effects on stock markets development.
Our study reexamine the conclusion using panel data and the FE estimation.
However, a different proxy measure - Political freedom Index by the Freedom
House Survey is applied in the thesis.
The Freedom in The World survey has been prepared since 1972 on a yearly
basis. The variable assesses the freedom difference across different countries
situated in different region and with diverse political systems and economic
environments. The survey and other Freedom house reports are actively used
by government and non-government institutions in decision making process.
(FreedomHouse 2014)
The Freedom in the World survey presents a yearly estimation of increase
and downfall of freedom level across 195 sovereign countries and 14 territorial
entities. It combines reports with detailed summaries, as well the digital mea-
surements of the country ratings. The measurement incorporates two board
subgroups: political rights (PR) and civil liberties ratings(CL). The two cate-
gories further can be decomposed as follows:
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Political rights is estimated based on the three subgroup variables:
 Process of election
 Level of participation and political pluralism
 Government functioning
Civil liberties evaluation includes four components:
 A level of freedom of expression and freedom of belief
 Rights associated with freedom to join or leave existing groups of orga-
nizations
 Rule of law
 Protection of individual right and personal freedom
Political rights and civil liberties both are evaluated in the range [1; 7] on a
yearly basis. Evaluation with 1 represents the highest indicator of freedom and
vice versa is true for 7. the rating itself are constructed by assigning a set of
points up to 100 that is counted from the questionnaire: 10 questions to assess
political rights and 15 question - civil liberties. Each question gives a country
from 0 to 4 points, where 0 means the lowest level of freedom and 4 means the
highest level. The next step step is formation of freedom rating. The freedom
rating is calculated from the averaged points of the PR and CL. And at the
end each country is assigned specific freedom status according to its averaged
freedom points as follows:
Free (1.0 - 2.5), Partially Free (3.0 - 5.0), Not Free (5.5 - 7.0)
The more detailed subgroup estimations are also available for countries
whose sub-indicators where affected but final results did not change. Analysis
of that aspect is out of goals of the paper.
Figure 3.4 depicts sample means from 1990-2011. Excluding the shift in
1990, the index was decreasing gradually, effectively meaning that democracy
and freedom level trend was improving.
The Freedom House survey control for cultural differences in estimating
level of freedom and offers generalized estimation that is built on the worldwide
accepted standards of political and civil rights. the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights is the ground rules of estimation that is applied to all sovereign
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countries and other entities. Geographical location, belonging to the different
ethical, cultural and religious groups and the real economic level of a country
is irrelevant for the survey. Furthermore, even though the indicator assesses
a number of different political variables, the measure provided is not meant
to estimate a government’s overall performance, since the measure in many
states is affected from the non-government factors such as paramilitary groups
or other influential institutions. (FreedomHouse 2014)
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Measure of Capital Account Openness - KAOPEN
Rajan & Zingales (2003) distinguish that the decision of openness policy might
be driven by a government’s political decisions. On the other hand main mo-
tivator of openness policy could be objectively established economics situation
which supports a country’s involvement in a global economy. For example,
there might be incumbents, an influential economic companies that gain ben-
efits by openness policies or it might be forced even by the existing external
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factors. As a result a countries’ capital account openness measures should be
categorized as a ‘de facto’ and ‘de jure’ measures. Since evaluation of country
independent factors is out of scope of our paper we utilize ‘de facto’ measure
of countries’ capital account openness - KAOPEN index originally derived by
Chinn and Ito.
There are a list of dummy variables that evaluate a country’s capital account
openness base on some specific characteristics. For our purposes that type
of measure are less useful, since they provide only the extreme levels of a
countries’ openness: 1 for financially open countries and 0 for financially not
open countries. As a result the dummy measures are not good to apply for the
precise variability across the countries. Therefore we suggest that the variability
of the Chinn and Ito index which takes values between [-2; 2.5] is more suitable
for explaining yearly variation of dependent variables across counties.
KAOPEN is derived from a set of dummy measures that are calculated
based on the restrictions on financial operations across countries. The dummy
variables are reported in the IMF’s AREAER (Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions). Before 1996, the index considers
the four main dummy variables that describes restrictions on across country
financial operations. The measures applied are:
 k1 a indicator of the multiple exchange rates across countries
 k2 a indicator of the restrictions on current account operations
 k3 an indicator of the restrictions on capital account operation
 k4 a indicator of the requirement complexity on exports of goods and
services.
The method of classification in the AREAER was changed in 1996 and the
four groups were further decomposed in more detailed subgroups in order to
capture the complexity of the polices assessing the capital control. Particularly,
k3 aggregate was dividing into 13 subgroups. Chinn & Ito (2006) follow the
specification suggested by Mody & Murshid (2005) when extending the index
after 1996.
Since the purpose of the index is to reflect level of financial openness and
not the level of capital account control, the authors reverse the values of the
binary measure. In addition, k3 measure for restrictions on capital operations
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is not incorporated in the index directly. Instead, a new measure is created
SHAEk3 that captures five years period, period t and the previous four.
SHAEk3,t =
k3,t + k3,t−1 + k3,t−2 + k3,t−3 + k3,t−4
5
(3.1)
The final step in the index construction is incorporating all the components
k1t, k2t SHAREk3, k4 and the first standardized principal component is the
index KAOPEN. The higher value KAOPEN takes the more financial openness
it means across the countries.
Chinn & Ito (2006) suggest that the specification leads to more precise
capturing of the level of the capital openness. Particularly, Chinn and Ito
openness index arguably is able to capture more meticulously the differences in
intensity of capital controls and to scale the financial openness of a country. As
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it is well observable from Figure 3.5 that the average of the KAOPEN index
increased for the last tow decades. The change means that counties have taken
steps towards to deeper capital account openness. The tread is in line with the
changes is financial development depth measures.
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Other Explanatory Variables
Gross domestic product per capita
The topic whether financial development promotes real growth or the reverse
causality is true has been an arguable for many economists. The supply-leading
hypothesis argues causal relationship from FD to economic growth which we
have already discussed. In contrast to such reasoning, demand-side view argues
that economic development causes increase in demand for financial resources
and financial sectors have to follow trend of economic development.
Calderón & Liu (2003) studies the causality effects between financial de-
velopment and economic growth. The study based on the pooled data of 109
industrial and developing countries suggested that, generally, financial devel-
opment causes economic growth. However the results also suggested that the
Granger causality form FD to economic growth and the Granger causality from
growth to financial development exist side-by-side and the two phenomena do
not eliminate each other. Moreover, Greenwood & Jovanovic (1990) suggest
that high rate of economic growth reduces transaction and financial interme-
diation cost since higher rate of economic development results larger amount
of funds that is available for investment. The natural outcome also is raise
of competitive environment in financial sector and boosting financial devel-
opment. Levine (2005) addresses the same topic, whether income per capita
is important factor affecting the financial development. The empirical results
form 23 developing market countries indicated statistically significant positive
effect of real income on financial development.
We include GDP per capita (in constant USD dollars) in the model. The two
main reasons of including the variable in the regression are: first, the measure
is necessary to control for the wealth effects and second, since we do not include
separate measures of institutional quality and technological development level,
the GDP per capita will serve as a good proxy of the level of institutional
development. As several studies suggest there is a strong correlation between
the GDP per capita variable and the level of institutional overall development
and it’s effectiveness (López de Silanes et al. 1998; Beck et al. 2003).
Trade Openness - Total trade to GDP
We similarly to the paper by Baltagi, Demetriades, & Law (2009) utilize the
fraction of total trade of goods and services to GDP as a proxy of trade open-
ness. The data is from the WDI.
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A number of studies addressed link between financial development and
trade. As Beck (2002) underlined financial development enhances large projects
development and as a result a country develops a competitive advantage in
manufacturing industry. The author by controlling county specific factors and
reverse causality problems, suggested that better financial system are capable
to boost exports and the difference between exports and imports for manu-
factured production. To sum up, the differences in courtiers financial systems
could be an solid factor of comparative advantage in international trade.
An opposite causality is argued by Do & Levchenko (2004). The authors
construct a model where financial development is endogenous and the results
suggest that trade is positively linked to the development of financial system.
In the model financial development is a product of a country’s productive eco-
nomic sectors. The specification comes from the observation that in countries
with strong, financial intensive sectors have better developed and more effec-
tive financial systems. The other interesting finding drawn from the paper is
that trade openness benefits rich countries more. The suggested explanation
of such outcome is the fact that trade openness causes solid growth of finan-
cial intensive sectors in wealthy countries and as a results boost demand for
financial services. The final outcome of the process is development of financial
sector. The opposite is true for law income countries. Trade openness leads
to shrink of financial intensive sectors, therefore demand for financial services
falls decreases and the level of financial development declines.
Inflation - annual GDP deflator
Our model utilizes the level of inflation, expressed in GDP deflator. As the
empirical research by Boyd, Levine, & Smith (2001) argues there is a signif-
icant negative effect of inflation on the banking sector and financial markets
development. The study provides an empirical evidence that higher inflation
disturbs capability of the financial institutions to effectively allocate and dis-
tribute financial resources.
In contrast to Boyd et al. (2001), Krugman (2014a) and Krugman (2014b)
suggest that inflation rates in EU and US are too low and the problem of
‘lowflation’ is present. Therefor the author argued that dramatic increase in
inflation at 4 percent level could boost economic activity. As a result one could
suggest that higher inflation could lead faster development of financial sector
as well.
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Tax to GDP
The requirement to pay taxes in local currency provides a legal ground for
money demand and consequently enhances the level of financial development.
The empirical studies suggest that the level of taxation is positively linked to
financial sector development in emerging market countries. However, high rate
of taxation decreases money demand and suppresses the depth of the financial
system (Tatom & Ott 2006).
Central government debt, total to GDP
In contrast to most of studies we include the fraction of public debt to GDP in
our model. The existing literature does not indicate which measure of public
debt is the most relevant in terms of determining the financial sector devel-
opment. Moreover, most of empirical studies assessing the determinants of
financial development did not incorporate a variable of public sector debts and
the works that did found results to be not significant (Boyd et al. 2001). How-
ever, there is a theoretical arguments both for and against public debts role in
financial development. On the one hand, the effect of public debt is examined
as a positive indicator since it provides relatively safe assets for financial insti-
tutions. The argument is called the ‘safe asset’ view. Contrary to that, there is
a proposition called a ‘lazy banks’ perspective. ‘Lazy banks’ view suggest that
the high level of public debt might support low scale development of banking
sector and financial markets, since the financial institutions that mainly land
to government institutions will have weak intensive to become more compatible
and further develop itself Hauner (2009).
Most of widely utilized macroeconomic variables such as gross domestic
product, GDP deflator or consumer price index follow the specification based on
the worldwide stand. This is not true for public debt measure. Countries often
does not follow the arranged global standards and as a result the measurement
error might be preset. To minimize the problem we will use data from WDI
which is based on international standards set by the World Bank.
The public debt according to the World Bank is the whole fixed term fi-
nancial obligations to other institutions on a specific date. The public debt
includes domestic and foreign financial obligations such as securities excluding
shares, money deposits, currency deposits and loans.
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3.3 Methodology
We examine the impact of above-mentioned political, institutional and macroe-
conomic factors on financial development in the OECD high income countries
and the developing countries from Europe and central Asia (Table A.2). The
empirical model specification is closely similar to the treatment Chinn & Ito
(2002). However, we utilize more update database and extend the model by in-
corporating additional time-variant variables: the Freedom House Survey Index
(FI), the fraction of tax revenues to GDP and total public debt.
Generally, the purpose of the thesis is to examine the long-term effects
expressed as follows:





















 FDit is a level of an i county’s financial development at time t;
 FI it is the Freedom House Survey Index;
 KAOPEN it is the Chinn and Ito index of financial openness;
 GDPPCit is gross domestic product per capita, which also serves as a
proxy measure of institutional quality;
 FDit−s measures i country’s financial development at time (t− s)
 TOit stands for trade openness captured by a fraction total trade to GDP;
 INF it is an inflation level, expressed by GDP price deflator;
 TAX it is a measure of a fraction total tax revenues to GDP;
 PDebtit is a measure of central government debt, total to GDP;
 (α0 + ui) takes into account heterogeneity of the data and provides dif-
ferent intercepts for each country.
A number of other explanatory variable could have be incorporated in the
model, but we similarly to Baltagi et al. (2009) employ a reasonably small
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number of independent variables, so that to maintain interpretability of the
existing correlations.
A number of empirical studies conclude the specification as suggested by
the equation (3.2) can not properly control for the secular drifts. The main
reason is the high scale business cyclical variations in the measures. Therefore
we will use alternative specification suggested by Chinn & Ito (2002):












The equation can be interpreted the following way: the financial development
rate is explained by the political factors, capital account openness level, gov-
ernment taxation policy, trade openness, institutional quality, inflation, public
debt and previous level of financial development. All the independent variables
are lagged for 5 years.
There are two reasons to follow the alternative specification. First, utilizing
the long time horizon of 5 years is an effective way to shrink the correlations
caused by the financial cyclical fluctuations. Second, linking the financial de-
velopment growth rate at t period to the explanatory variables at (t−5) period
provides an effective tool to diminish existing endogeneity obstacle presented
in the database.
Furthermore, if in the regression the where level of financial development or
it’s growth rate is explained by GDP per capita, capital account openness and
other explanatory variables, would be based on yearly basis, one could argue
that there is a two way causality effects. For example: positive correlation
of GDP to capita and financial deepening measure could be explained both
ways without knowing assertively the causality relation between the variables,
since economic development can enhance the financial development and the the
relation can be vice versa as well. The five year period analysis diminishes the
problem, however it does not fully solve it. The drawback of the model clearly
is loosing data because of averaged dependent variable and lagged explanatory
variables (Chinn & Ito 2002).
In contrast to the paper of Chinn & Ito (2002) that utilizes OLS and 2SLS
models, in our empirical study we will apply the panel dataset fixed effects esti-
mator (FE). It is reasonable estimation method for our cross-country data given
the fact that unobserved factors across countries are correlated with the level of
financial development. Using only time-series and cross-sectional models most
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likely will provide inconsistent and biased results as far as county specific un-
observed factors are present and these two models are not good in dealing with
heterogeneity problem. The main advantage of FE estimator is that it takes
into account the unobserved factors, which are correlated to response variable.
FE model considers two types of unobserved variables: (1) factors that are time
invariant but change across countries and (2) factors which change over time
dimensions and across countries. Using simple transformation FE model suc-
cessfully deals the problem described above and it is capable to provide robust
estimates even in case of large number of unobserved independent variables.
Nevertheless, this obvious advantage of FE model over time-series and cross
sectional models is not achieved without tradeoff. The main drawback of the
model is its failure to estimate time constant variables (Wooldridge 2010)
In panel data estimation, using a Hausman test, we will check if the random
effect model or the fixed effect model is appropriate for our analysis. However,
the FE model is usually well suited for analyzing the impact of variable that
vary over time. The model explores the relationship between explanatory and
response variables within entities. Each explanatory variable has its own char-
acteristics that might or might not affect explained variable.
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for the selected explanatory vari-
ables. In the table overall mean, std. deviation, minimum, maximum and
number of observations are presented. Most of countries in our sample have a
high evaluation in political freedom index, consequently setting the mean of the
index around 2. Furthermore, the table indicates that average of the fraction
total trade to GDP is at 77 percent, indicating that on average countries have
open economies.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Explanatory Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Pol Freedom 2.057 1.469 1 6.5 848
kaopen 1.207 1.519 -1.864 2.439 782
GDPPC 20256.149 15927.18 565.156 67804.546 858
TotalTrade 77.346 31.572 15.924 180.501 855
Inflation 51.513 261.246 -18.93 4107.297 851
TaxToGDP 19.818 7.325 6.787 59.373 558
CentGovDebt 58.644 37.728 4.577 261.729 446
Source: author’s computations
More detailed summary table can be seen in the Appendix A. Figure A.4
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additionally provides description across between and within dimensions of the
dataset.






The correlation level between the two measure of financial development and
the theoretical reasoning supports a suggestion that explanatory variables in
regressions assessing the (1)Bank private credit to GDP and (2)Liquid liabilities
to GDP should yield the same signs of coefficients. The sign prediction of
coefficients based on our hypotheses and theoretical framework is following
(Table 3.3):
Table 3.3: Sign Prediction for the Independent Variables
Pol Freedom kaopen GDPPC TotTrade Inflation TaxToGDP CentGovDebt
- + + + -/+ - -
Source: author’s computations
Political Freedom index estimating a country level freedom should have a
negative effect because of the measurement spesification: higher value of index
means a country is less free.
A bulk of theoretical literature suggests that institutional development and
as a result financial growth rate should be dependent on the democracy and
freedom, a political system that promotes competition in elections and deeper
population involvement the derision making process. Such a political regime
is also a guarantee for rule based control of government, that limits possibility
of misbehavior based on moral hazards. It can be argued that the competitive
political system enhances effectiveness of financial systems (Haber et al. 2008).
Contrary to the suggestions an empirical study by Yang (2011) argued that
democracy has a significant positive effect on the depth of financial system only
when cross sectional data analysis is applied, but once the analysis is treated
with panel data models minimizing the endogeneity problem, significance of
the relation between the two variables disappears. Our study aims to recheck
conclusion drawn by Yang (2011).
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TaxToGDP variable is predicted to have a negative sign. Albeit one can
argue that higher taxes is legal ground to higher demand of local currency and
financial development, we expect the effect to be less important for the selected
countries (Table A.2). Based on the literature review we predict taxes to have a
negative effect of financial development, since higher taxes are associated with
repression of financial system.
According to our hypothesis we expect that size of financial sector has
negative or close to zero coefficient.
We expect other variables KAOPEN index, GDPPC and TotalTrade to
yield the same coefficient signs as describe by Chinn & Ito (2006) and Baltagi
et al. (2009). For public debt level, we predict the correlation to be negative.
The Table 3.4 illustrates correlation among the explanatory variables. The
results do not indicate existence of too strong inter-correlation among the ex-
planatory variables that could lead to multicollinearity problem.
Table 3.4: Correlation among the Explanatory Variables
GDPPC FreeI. kaop TotalT. Inf. Tax. C.G.Debt
GDPPC 1
Pol Freedom -0.6499 1
kaopen 0.6961 -0.7726 1
TotalTrade -0.2377 0.1588 -0.2274 1
Inflation -0.3066 0.4843 -0.4424 0.1878 1
TaxToGDP 0.2462 -0.2609 0.1099 0.1575 -0.0785 1
CentGovDebt 0.157 -0.3475 0.2365 -0.0905 -0.1829 0.3869 1
Source: author’s computations
Chapter 4
Title of Chapter Four
4.1 Chapter Overview
Objective of the empirical study is to examine determinants of financial de-
velopment and providing data based evidence evaluating the hypotheses of our
interest. In this chapter above described empirical specification ( Equation 3.3)
is applied. In order to address edogeneity problems associated with short term
business cycles, the model is constructed as a growth rate of FD on existing
level of independent variables lagged by 5 yeas regression and closely follows
the specification suggested by Chinn & Ito (2002).
We categorize the potential determinants of financial development into 8
components: (1)political factors captured by the Freedom in the World Survey
index, (2)‘de jure’ capital account openness (KAOPEN), (3)real income per
capita, (4)existing size of financial sector compared to GDP, (5)trade openness,
(6)GDP deflator, (7)tax revenues and (8)public debt. We run regressions for
different explanatory variables: (a)Bank Private Credit to GDP and (b)Liquid
liabilities to GDP and provide robustness checks of our suggestions by utilizing
alternative measures of political freedom and dropping insignificant variable to
check stability of the regression output.
The literature studying determinants of financial development often pro-
vides controversial suggestions. We will empirically verify a number of ques-
tions. Recent empirical paper by Yang (2011) argues that statistically signifi-
cant link between democracy and financial development disappears once panel
data estimation is applied. Our study checks the suggestion using fixed effects
estimation technique. We also address effects of capital account openness, real
per capita income, level of financial development, price level, and total tax
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revenues to GDP on rate of financial development.
The chapter also includes detailed interpretation of the results and compar-
ative analysis to the results from previous studies.
4.2 Model Specification - Bank Private Credit to
GDP
We estimate the panel data using fixed effects model. The model as already
mentioned in the methodology section usually is the most suitable approach
to deal with heterogeneity across counties. Existence of the heterogeneity is
highlighted in the data description part of the thesis Figure 3.2. Furthermore,
the Hausman Test proves our assumption that the model should best suited
for our estimation.
Table 4.1 depict the regression output. F test indicates that there is a
significant fixed country effects in the data and the FE model is correctly
selected.
Free Index (β1)
The regression indicates the Freedom Index to be significant at .10 signifi-
cance level. The negative sing of the coefficient comes from the Freedom Index
specification. Since 1 is highest evaluation of freedom and democracy and 7
for the lowest scale, (-) sign is in line with our suggestion that more freedom
and democracy enhances financial development.The result is in line with our
predicted sign.
Yang (2011) suggested that democracy has a significant empirical effect
on financial sector depth only when cross sectional data analysis is applied.
However once panel regression is utilized, the author argued coefficient’s level
of significance disappeared.
In contrast to the empirical paper by Yang (2011), we find political free-
dom and democracy to have a significant effect on financial development for
the selected region (Europe and Central Asia and OECD countries) even with
panel data estimation which diminishes endogeneity problem. To see robust-
ness of the hypothesis suggesting the positive correlation between democracy
and financial development, we will utilize a different measure from the project
PolityIV to describe political regime characteristics according to different vari-
able.
4. Title of Chapter Four 36
Table 4.1: Fixed-effects Regression for 5 Years Growth Rate of
Bank private credit to GDP, Std. Err. Adjusted for
























+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Note : All regressors are lagged by 5 years
Source: author’s computations
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kaopen (β2)
One of the stated hypotheses was that there is a strong positive correlation
between financial openness and the rate of financial development. Based on
analysis of the Table 4.1, second row indicates the positive effect of capital
account openness on the financial development. The results are in line with
Chinn & Ito (2006), Baltagi et al. (2009) and other empirical studies that
capital account openness can boost financial development. There is a a signifi-
cant positive inter-correlation between between capital financial openness and
financial development. The statistical significance of the β2 is at the .05 level.
GDPPC (β3)
The theoretical framework suggested that GDP per capita has a significant
positive impact on the financial development. The Table 4.1 empirically con-
firms that GDP per capita is positively correlated to the financial development.
The β3 coefficient is at the .05 level. The main reason is that the variable ex-
plains the wealth effects. Countries with higher per capita income tend to have
better financial systems. Furthermore, since our empirical specification does
not include variables describing the institutional development in the model,
GDPPC measure additionally serves as a proxy measure of institutional qual-
ity and its scale of development. Usually there is a strong link between these
two measures.
The work does not incorporate measures of institutional development, since
they are time invariant or change insignificantly over twenty years period and
we will not be able to effectively check the results by fixed effects estimation.
Additionally, we do not consider including separate institutional variables nec-
essary considering that (1) GDP per capita as mentioned above can serve as a
good proxy of institutional quality and (2) we do not aim to check link between
institutional developments and financial development.
Size of Financial System (β4)
The result indicate previous size of financial development to have a negative
effect on the rate of financial deepening. The 95 percent confidence interval
is [-0.8572679;-0.3078852].The outcome supports our the hypothesis that deep
financial system does not guarantee higher rate of financial development.
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TaxToGDP (β7)
The regression output depicts positive link between total tax revenues and
financial development rate. The result is in contrast to the predicted sign of
β7 coefficient. We suggested that the effect of taxes should have been negative
on financial development, since it causes repression of financial sector and as a
result slow rate of financial development.
A possible explanation of such inter-correlation is described by Gilbert &
Ilievski (2011). The authors suggest that fraction of tax revenues to GDP
describes the size of public sector rather then fiscal pressure on a financial
sector and argues that the public sector size and the depth of financial system
co-emerges due to changes in technology and overall development level of a
country. Moreover, Gilbert & Ilievski (2011) provides an empirical evidence
that the fraction of the tax revenues as a share of GDP is higher in better
developed countries then in developing countries.
A demand side explanation of the reasoning is simple one: better developed
countries have stronger requirements and demand for public projects. An-
other explanation is that low tax-to-GDP ratio could be a reflection of existing
problems in tax collection enforcement mechanisms or existence of an informal
economic sector.
Other Explanatory Variables
Our model with response variable bank private credit to GDP does not detect
significance of following coefficient β5, β6, β8.
4.3 Model Specification - Liquid liabilities to GDP
The regression with response variable Liquid liabilities to GDP yields similar
results as the model with Bank private debt to GDP and supports the robust-
ness of the above discussed interpretations (Table 4.2). However there are a
few meaningful differences.
First, we find the Free Index coefficient to be significant at .05 significance
level compared to .10 form the previous one. Furthermore, the 95 percent
confidence interval is strongly negative.
The results indicate higher level of significance for TaxToGDP variable (at
.01 confidence level) providing stronger evidence supporting the suggestion that
tax revenues and banking sector development are positively correlated. The
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Table 4.2: Fixed-effects Regression for 5 Years Growth Rate of
Liquid liabilities to GDP, Std. Err. Adjusted for 32
























+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Note : All regressors are lagged by 5 years
Source: author’s computations
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results are opposite to our initial prediction of the variable coefficient and are
supporting arguments by Gilbert & Ilievski (2011). Apparently total taxes
does not describe well the level of fiscal stress exclusively on financial sector,
but it is a proxy measure of products and services provided by public sector.
Therefore it is intuitive that countries with higher level of technological and
economic development have higher demand for public good. As a result for the
selected sample of countries, TaxToGDP and FD indicators are co-emerging.
It is an interesting question to test weather the results would be similar for
tax levels exclusively on financial sectors. However, the topic is out of scope of
current thesis.
Inflation (β6)
In contrast to the regression with Bank private credit to GDP, in the specifi-
cation with liquid liabilities to GDP inflation has an significant coefficient at
.05 significance level.
The coefficient of inflation rate is positively linked to the rate of financial
development. Albeit there is controversies in the theoretical framework con-
cerning the inflation effects on the rate of financial development, one could
argue that it is in line with the recent suggestions by Paul Krugman.
Krugman (2014a) in his recent blog argued that there is ‘the Inflation Ob-
session’. The author states that the obsession is persistent for a long period
and did not change even during the crisis. As an example he illustrates that
on the meeting the day after Lehman fell inflation was mentioned 322 times,
while unemployment and systematic risks only 28 and 19 times relatively.
The idea is developed in another blog by Krugman (2014b) that suggests
that in the US and Europe inflations are too low and destructive for economic
development. The conclusion is supported by I.M.F. research which discusses
problems that might be caused by the ‘lowfation’. The article also provides
the comparison for US and UK. Historical experience supported the idea that
the country (US) that was willing to reduce real size of its debt by letting
inflation to be loose, could perform better than a country (UK), which did
not consider violation of orthodox fiscal and monetary approach. However,
Krugman argues that final conclusions of the I.M.F. report is somewhat modest
to say straightforward the finding that it implies.
The author suggests that it is vital to finish ‘lowflation’. Low level of in-
flation according to Krugman (2014b) supports existence of liquidity traps -
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a situation when real interest rate at 0 can not restore full employment level.
The liquidity traps also is supported by the global tendency of investors to
save money ‘safe’ and do not reinvest available funds. Finally the blog calls
for heterodox measure, which would increase inflation target at 4 percent level.
The author think that modest changes will not be able to finish liquidity trap.
Since the main hypothesis of the study assesses political freedom effects on
the rate of financial development, in the next part of the paper we will apply an
alternative measure of political regime and level of democracy in the selected
countries.
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4.4 Robustness Checks
4.4.1 Analysis with Polity2 Index
We, run above described regression with an alternative measure of political
factors, and particularly the level of democracy. The regression is run for
the same sample of countries (Table A.2) and provides a good opportunity to
compare the specifications for Free Index vs polity2 index.
Measurement of political freedom and democracy with high accuracy could
be extremely difficult. Therefore the regression results where proxy of political
openness is Free Index might have suffered from the poor measurement. To
recheck above mentioned determinants impact on the rate of financial devel-
opment, we run a regression with an alternative variable measuring level of
institutionalized democracy.
Polity2 index itself is calculated based on two complex measures DEMOC
and AUTOC, relatively describing institutionalized democracy and autocracy
(Marshall & Jaggers 2002).
DEMOC
The variable takes values from 0 to 10, relatively for a country with now
democracy and for a country with the highest level of democracy. DEMOC
is a proxy measure of institutionalized democracy which has three essential
components that are independent from each other:
1. Existence of institutions that can guarantee that population can effec-
tively express their choices and choose public officials form alternative
political forces and leader;
2. Existence of rule based procedures that are capable to constrain the haz-
ardous use of power by the public figures;
3. Existence of guarantees for the population to exercise civil liberties. . . .
According to the variable an absolute democracy would have the following
characteristics: political involvement is absolutely competitive; public positions
are elective; there is a substantial law based limitations on the public executives.
AUTOC
The variable measures level of institutionalized autocracy, also referred as
authoritarian regime. The main characteristics of the authoritarian political
systems are as follows:
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1. The regime clearly limits political competition and restricts political free-
dom;
2. Political leaders are assigned based on decision of political elites;
3. One the political leaders are exercising their power, there is few or no
constraints limiting their behavior. . . .
Similarly to the index DEMOC, the variable AUTOC ranges from 0 to 10,
as mentioned combined and revised score of the two measures is Polity2 index.
In contrast to Free Index, higher numerical value of Polity2 index represents
higher level of democracy. Table 4.3 depicts high negative correlation between
Freedom Index and Polity2 index. Therefore, we expect the coefficient of the
variable to be significant and positive.
Table 4.3: Correlation between Polity2 and The Freedom Index
polity Political Freedom
polity2 1.0000
Political Freedom -0.8633 1.0000
Source: author’s computations
Table 4.4 presents a descriptive summary of the variable Polity2. Similarly
to the Freedom index, mean of Polity2 variable highlights that most of the
countries have institutionalized democracy.
Table 4.4: Descriptive Summary of Polity2 Index
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
polity2 831 7.914561 4.199388 -7 10
Source: author’s computations
Polity2 variable is extracted from the Polity IV project. The variable mea-
sure indicates a country’s combined score of democracy and autocracy. The
variable is one of the most widely utilized in the empirical papers, since it is
standardized for times series analysis and takes values in the interval [-10; 10],
where -10 describes a country with an absolute autocracy and 10 means highest
level of democracy.
First we run the regression for Bank private credit to GDP with explanatory
variable Polity2, an alternative measure of freedom and democracy.
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Table 4.5: Fixed-effects Regression for 5 Years Growth Rate of
Bank private credit to GDP, Std. Err. Adjusted for
32 clusters in County (1990-2011)
























+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Note : All regressors are lagged by 5 years
Source: author’s computations
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Table 4.6: Fixed-effects Regression for 5 Years Growth Rate of
Liquid liabilities to GDP, Std. Err. Adjusted for 32
clusters in County (1990-2011)
























+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Note : All regressors are lagged by 5 years
Source: author’s computations
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Table 4.5 illustrates the results of the regression. Signs and level of signif-
icance of the coefficients are similar to the specifications with the explanatory
variable Political Freedom.
Polity2 variable has a positive effect on the rate of FD at the .05 significance
level. We find the coefficient of the variable to be relatively small in absolute
value compared to regressors Political Freedom coefficient. The observation
is easily interpretable taking into account that Polity two varies in the range
[-10;10], while the Political Freedom takes values in a shorter range from 1 to
7.
The regression reflects coefficients of lagged variables - kaopen,GDPPC
and size of financial sector to be statistically significant at .01 significance
level. The sign of the variables’ coefficients are as expected by the hypotheses
of the thesis: increase in capital account openness and real income per capita
leads to higher rate of financial development; the size of the financial sector has
(-) sign indicating that for the selected countries deeper financial sector does
not cause better rate of FD.
The coefficient of inflation is also in line with aforementioned suggestions.
Positive dependence of financial development on the level of GDP deflator sup-
ports reasoning by Krugman (2014b), which stated that US and EU countries
have a ‘lowflation’ and monetary injections could be beneficial.
Table 4.6 table depicts the results form the regression for 5 years growth
rate of the Liquid liabilities to GDP Polity2 index and a vector of aforemen-
tioned independent variables. Compared to the regression results illustrated by
Table 4.5, Polity2 has weaker significance, at the 10.1 % level. For the other
variables we find the same inter-correlation signs.
To recapitulate above discussed results from the retrogressions we include
a summarizing table in the Appendix A. Table A.1 contains regressions’ coeffi-
cients for Bank private credit to GDP and Liquid liabilities to GDP on a vector
of independent variables and two alternative measures of political freedom and
democracy. The empirical part of the thesis outlines the following statisti-
cal evidence for the OECD countries and developing countries in Europe and
Central Asia (Table A.2):
Political freedom and democracy is observed to have positive effects on
the financial development rate. The main specification with Political Freedom
as a independent variable and with an alternative measure Polity2 supports
the hypothesis that political freedom and particularly, protection of political
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rights and civil liberties can enhance financial development. The coefficient are
significant at .05 significance level for (2) and (3) regressions and at 0.1 for (1)
and (4) specification (Table A.1).
Similarly, to studies by Chinn & Ito (2006) and Baltagi et al. (2009), we find
capital account openness to be positively correlated to financial development
rate. The main regressions and the robustness checks depicted that financial
openness promotes rate of increase of Private credit to GDP with larger scale
than it enhances Liquid liabilities to GDP.
For all lagged variables of financial sector size, empirical study of the thesis
suggests that countries with deep financial sector do not necessarily have higher
rate of financial development. The coefficients of lagged financial development
variables are significant at .001 and negative for all the four specifications.
As expected real income per capita has a positive correlation on the rate of
FD. It can be seen from the Table A.1 that GDPPC has a positive coefficient
and is significant at .001 significance level for all the four regressions. However
the coefficients are close to 0, which could be interpreted that increase in per
capita income will not boost rate of FD in a large scales.
The empirical part of the study finds inflation to have a positive effect on
financial development. The results are significant at .05 significance level in
the 3 models. Only first specification indicates statistical insignificance of the
coefficient. One could argue that the results are in line to the suggestions
by KRUGMAN, that US and European countries might be facing too law
inflation rates. As a result, higher inflation could support economic activity
and deepening of financial sector.
In contrast to our predated sign, we find total tax revenues coefficient to
have positive impact on the level of financial development. The results are
significant for (1) regression at 0.05 significance level, for (2) - at 0.01 and for
(4) - at 0.1. The Table A.1 depicts coefficients of total tax revenues to be
positive for all four regressions. One could suggest the following explanation:
the variable total tax revenues to GDP do not exclusively measure fiscal pres-
sure on financial system. However the variable is an important determinant of
finanical development rate, since it is a proxy of amount of goods and serviles
produced by the public sector. More tax revenues means a government will
finance more projects and produce more public goods. Taking into account
the reasoning Gilbert & Ilievski (2011) argued that level of tax revenues and
financial development co-emerges as county technological and economic level
increases.
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4.4.2 Analysis with dropped Total Trade variable
Lastly, we check whether our initial results are stable once a statistically in-
significant dependent variable is dropped form the regression. All above pre-
sented regressions underline that total trade to GDP, as a sum of imports and
exports of goods and services, does not have a statistically significant effect
of financial development. We drop the variable to compare stability of initial
output depicted by the Table 4.1 and the Table 4.2
Table 4.7: Fixed-effects Regression for 5 Years Growth Rate of
Bank private credit to GDP, Std. Err. Adjusted for
32 clusters in County (1990-2011)






















+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Note : All regressors are lagged by 5 years
Source: author’s computations
According to the Table 4.7 and Table 4.8, the results stay stable even once
the total trade is dropped form the regression. We find that with the modified
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Table 4.8: Fixed-effects Regression for 5 Years Growth Rate of
Liquid liabilities to GDP, Std. Err. Adjusted for 32
clusters in County (1990-2011)






















+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Note : All regressors are lagged by 5 years
Source: author’s computations
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specification Political Freedom to have statisitcally significant effect on the rate
of financial development, Bank Private Credit to GDP and Liquid Liabilities
to GDP, at .10 and .05 significance level relatively.
Similarly to political freedom, other results also does not change sign of co-
efficient and mainly their numerical values stay close to baseline output results.
For instance, it is observable that real GDP per capita, GDP deflater level and
total tax revenues to GDP maintain statistically significant positive coefficients
and level of financial development also has statistically significant inverse effect
on the rate of financial development. However for Kaopen index, we find results
to stay statistically significant only in the Table 4.7 at .01 significance level.
The empirical evidence form the Table 4.8 suggests that once trade openness
‘de facto’ measure is dropped from the regression, statistical significance of the
Kaopen index disappears.
Based on the afore discussed theoretical and empirical study the following
chapter provides final remarks and conclusions.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The positive link between financial development and economic growth moti-
vated us to study determinants of financial development. We applied a model
where rate of financial development was regressed on the level of financial de-
velopment and on the vector of other explanatory variables, including measures
of (1) political freedom and democracy, (2) capital account openness, (3) real
income per capita, (4) total trade, (5) GDP deflator, (6) total tax revenues
and (7) public debt. All regressors where lagged by five years to mitigate
endogeneity problem.
Fixed effects estimation technique was applied in the empirical study. The
model is a reasonable estimation approach for the panel data given the fact that
unobserved factors across countries are correlated with the level of financial
development. We collected data for 39 countries from various sources: the
World Bank’s GFDD and WDI, the dataset associated with Chinn & Ito, the
Freedom in the World Survey from the Freedom House and Polity2 index form
the PolityIV project. To diminish endogeneity problem and to treat cyclical
correlations of the dataset, we applied specification similar to Chinn & Ito
(2002; 2006), which is using 5 year horizon: a 5 years growth rate of financial
development is estimated by the rate of financial development and a vector of
other explanatory variables, where all repressors are lagged by 5 year.
We see econometrical verification of positive link between electoral democ-
racy and rate of financial development as the main contribution of the study.
We utilized two alternative measures of political factors to evaluate effects of
political freedom on the rate of financial development, as measured by bank
private credit to GDP and liquid liabilities to GDP. All results supported the
suggestion that competitive political system can spur financial development.
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Other findings of the study are: our results confirm financial openness hy-
pothesis suggesting that capital account openness leads to financial develop-
ment; we also find real per capita income to have a positive and statistically
significant coefficient in the regressions, while the size of financial sector is in-
versely linked to the rate of financial development; Based on the results, it
seems for the selected countries that price level measured by GDP deflator and
the fraction of total tax revenues to GDP to be positively linked to the rate of
financial development.
The observed results are robust when alternative measures of political free-
dom is applied and coefficients of the regression reveal to be stable once in-
significant explanatory variable is dropped from the regression.
For further research, it is interesting to check whether taxes on financial
sector will yield the same results as the variable - total tax revenues to GDP.
Also more thought has to be given to the differences between developed and
developing countries. Due to shortage of the data of emerging market countries
we do not address the problem comprehensively, therefore the results presented
might not be fully applicable for middle income countries.
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, & J. A. Robinson (2005): “Institutions as a
fundamental cause of long-run growth.” Handbook of economic growth 1: pp.
385–472.
Arestis, P. (2006): “21 financial liberalization and the relationship between
finance and growth.” A Handbook of Alternative Monetary Economics p.
346.
Auerbach, P. & J. Uddin Siddiki (2004): “Financial liberalisation and eco-
nomic development: an assessment.” Journal of Economic Surveys 18(3):
pp. 231–265.
Baltagi, B. H., P. O. Demetriades, & S. H. Law (2009): “Financial devel-
opment and openness: Evidence from panel data.” Journal of development
economics 89(2): pp. 285–296.
Beck, T. (2002): “Financial development and international trade: is there a
link?” Journal of international Economics 57(1): pp. 107–131.
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A. Description of Variables and County List II








1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Private Credit by Deposit Money B Mean by Years
Source: Author’s computations
A. Description of Variables and County List III
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Year
Liquid Liabilities to GDPGF Mean by Years
Source: Author’s computations
A. Description of Variables and County List IV
Figure A.4: Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory and Response Vari-
ables
 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
PrCredit overall |  77.82349    57.8318   .1152023   284.6218 |     N =     766 
GDP      between |             52.22739   7.224279   195.1233 |     n =      39 
         within  |             25.04888   6.625986   193.2056 | T-bar =  19.641 
                 |                                            | 
M3toGDP  overall |  68.98041   44.68423   .2478361   256.5764 |     N =     795 
         between |             41.56117   12.60284   206.0832 |     n =      39 
         within  |             16.61108   8.435756   158.1651 | T-bar = 20.3846 
                 |                                            | 
kaopen   overall |  1.207024   1.518946  -1.863972   2.439009 |     N =     782 
         between |             1.365715  -1.342614   2.439009 |     n =      39 
         within  |             .7783565  -1.317331   3.584276 | T-bar = 20.0513 
                 |                                            | 
Free     overall |  2.057193   1.468873          1        6.5 |     N =     848 
Index    between |              1.44081          1   5.761905 |     n =      39 
         within  |             .4154526  -.2047114   4.966284 | T-bar = 21.7436 
                 |                                            | 
GDPPC    overall |  20256.15   15927.18   565.1557   67804.55 |     N =     858 
         between |             15842.81   847.0234   58686.67 |     n =      39 
         within  |             2971.695   6259.115   29374.03 |     T =      22 
                 |                                            | 
Total    overall |  77.34646   31.57204   15.92399   180.5012 |     N =     855 
Tradeto  between |             28.15625   22.85051   142.9676 |     n =      39 
GDP      within  |             14.88883   11.95678   137.9191 | T-bar = 21.9231 
                 |                                            | 
TaxToGDP overall |  19.81827   7.325087   6.787221   59.37311 |     N =     558 
         between |             6.970244   9.833259   43.85023 |     n =      39 
         within  |             2.501928   1.738722   35.34114 | T-bar = 14.3077 
                 |                                            | 
Inflat.  overall |   51.5126   261.2456  -18.92973   4107.297 |     N =     851 
         between |             90.59428  -.5081443   313.3819 |     n =      39 
         within  |             245.7204  -256.7474   3853.832 | T-bar = 21.8205 
                 |                                            | 
CentGov. overall |  58.64421   37.72829   4.576538   261.7287 |     N =     446 
Debt     between |             37.61706   5.752375   159.7126 |     n =      35 
         within  |             13.86768    .314662   165.3077 | T-bar = 12.7429 
Source: Author’s computations.
A. Description of Variables and County List V
Figure A.5: Hausman Test
Hausman test - Bank private credit to GDP Regression 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =      276.91 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 




Hausman Test - Liquid liabilites to GDP Regression  
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =      217.59 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
Source: Author’s computations

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































A. Description of Variables and County List VII
Table A.2: Country List (39 Countries)
Country Name Income Group Region
1 Albania Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia
2 Armenia Lower middle income Europe & Central Asia
3 Australia High income: OECD East Asia & Pacific
4 Austria High income: OECD Europe & Central Asia
5 Azerbaijan Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia
6 Belarus Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia
7 Belgium High income: OECD Europe & Central Asia
8 Bulgaria Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia
9 Canada High income: OECD North America
10 Cyprus High income: nonOECD Europe & Central Asia
11 Czech Republic High income: OECD Europe & Central Asia
12 Denmark High income: OECD Europe & Central Asia
13 Finland High income: OECD Europe & Central Asia
14 France High income: OECD Europe & Central Asia
15 Germany High income: OECD Europe & Central Asia
16 Greece High income: OECD Europe & Central Asia
17 Hungary Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia
18 Israel High income: OECD Middle East & North Africa
19 Italy High income: OECD Europe & Central Asia
20 Japan High income: OECD East Asia & Pacific
21 Kazakhstan Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia
22 Korea, Rep. High income: OECD East Asia & Pacific
23 Latvia High income: nonOECD Europe & Central Asia
24 Macedonia, FYR Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia
25 Moldova Lower middle income Europe & Central Asia
26 Netherlands High income: OECD Europe & Central Asia
27 New Zealand High income: OECD East Asia & Pacific
28 Norway High income: OECD Europe & Central Asia
29 Poland High income: OECD Europe & Central Asia
30 Portugal High income: OECD Europe & Central Asia
31 Romania Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia
32 Russian Federation High income: nonOECD Europe & Central Asia
33 Spain High income: OECD Europe & Central Asia
34 Sweden High income: OECD Europe & Central Asia
35 Switzerland High income: OECD Europe & Central Asia
36 Turkey Upper middle income Europe & Central Asia
37 Ukraine Lower middle income Europe & Central Asia
38 United Kingdom High income: OECD Europe & Central Asia
39 United States High income: OECD North America
